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COMMENTS
SILENCE IS NOT ALWAYS GOLDEN: MORTGAGE
PREPAYMENT IN THE COMMERCIAL LOAN CONTEXT
Carl Adams owns a small hardware store in Baltimore County.
Through much hard work, he has been able to establish a reputation
for knowledge, service, and dependability, which has resulted in the
steady growth of his business despite the recent slump in the construction and housing industries. After renting space for several years,
Carl now has the opportunity to purchase his store building. As his
attorney, you are able to negotiate what you believe is an excellent
arrangement for Carl. The owner of the building, John Walker, has
agreed to take back a purchase money mortgage for all but a minimal
down payment at a favorable interest rate. The twenty-year term you
have convinced the owner to accept will keep Carl's payments relatively low, which is important to Carl. Using a standard form note
and mortgage you obtain from the library, the deal closes. Carl is
pleased and speaks highly of your work to his friends and customers.
You close the file on the transaction, satisfied that you have served
Carl well.
But have you? It is now eight years later, and Carl speaks of
your service with a different tone. The economy is flourishing, and
along with it, Carl's hardware store. Carl has the opportunity to
expand his store into the adjoining building. Interest rates have
decreased significantly, and Carl's bank is willing to lend him enough
.to refinance the existing loan and purchase the new space. He will
be able to save a substantial amount in monthly payments by
structuring the financing in this manner rather than taking out a
mortgage only on the second bUilding. Carl is shocked and angry
when John Walker tells him that he will refuse to accept early payoff
of his loan. Carl calls your office insisting that you immediately
write Walker a letter informing him that he has no choice but to
accept the payoff. You set up an appointment with Carl for the next
day and begin to research the issue. As you review the form note
you used, a knot develops in your stomach. You sleep very little
that night, thinking of Carl's reaction to the answer you must give
him.
In Promenade Towers Mutual Housing Corp. v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co., I the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the
1. 324 Md. 588, 597 A.2d 1377 (1991) (Promenade /I).
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rule of "perfect tender in time," under which, absent statute, contractual provisions, or agreements to the contrary, a mortgagor does
not have the right to payoff a mortgage loan prior to the maturity
date specified within the loan contract.2 Although for years generally
considered to be the common law in Maryland,) the rule had never
been expressly adopted by the court.
The note that you used for Carl's loan from John Walker did
not contain a prepayment clause. 4 This silence is fatal to Carl's desire
to pay the loan off early unless Walker cooperates. Carl may be able
to make payoff more attractive to Walker by offering to pay an
additional lump sum amount, commonly called a prepayment premium or penalty. You could have included such a provision in the
original note. At that time, Walker's primary concern was to sell his
building; he probably would not have objected to a reasonable
prepayment option. Unfortunately for Carl, at this time Walker is
most concerned with maintaining the income stream he has become
dependent on, and Walker now has bargaining superiority.
The concept that one does not inherently have the right to payoff
debt at will may be foreign to many people. Consumer lending laws 5

~'perfect tender in time" is the
general or majority rule in this country. See, e.g., 3 RICHARD R. POWELL,
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY , 46O[3][f] (1993); 55 AM. lUR. 2D Mortgages
§ 397 (1971); 59 C.l.S. Mortgages § 447(a) (1949). The converse of this rule is
referred to as the civil law rule or as a presumption of prepayment. The civil
law rule considers the maturity date to be for the benefit of the debtor only,
and allows the debtor to prepay at will, thus creating a presumption that the
debtor may prepay the loan unless the contract specifies otherwise. Promenade
II, 324 Md. at 600, 597 A.2d at 1383.
3. Promenade II, 324 Md. at 602, 597 A.2d at 1384 (citing HYMAN GINSBERG &
ISIDORE GINSBERG, MORTGAGES AND OTHER LIENS IN MARYLAND 236 (1936);
HERBERT TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 537,
at 1235 n.276 (1912».
4. Such a clause sets forth the right, if any, of the borrower to prepay, along
with any charges or penalties due in the event that right is. exercised. If no
prepayment clause is included, leaving the loan contract silent on the issue of
prepayment, the rule of "perfect tender in time" will apply unless a statute
grants the right to prepay.
5. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-S0S(e) (1990) ("A buyer may prepay
at any time, without penalty, all or any part of the outstanding balance of a
closed end [retail credit] account."); id. § 12-612(b) ("A buyer may prepay at
any time, without penalty, all or part of the outstanding balance payable under
an installment sale agreement relating to consumer goods."); id. § 12-620(a)
("[A] buyer may prepay at any time, without penalty, all or any part of the
unpaid balance payable under the installment sale agreement if such agreement
is for the retail sale of personal property purchased primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes .... "); id. § 12-635(a) ("A sales finance company shall permit a buyer to prepay in full or in part at any time, without
penalty, the outstanding balance payable under a renewal, extension, or refund

2. [d. at 603, 597 A.2d at 1384. The rule of
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and tbe policies of many purchasers of residential mortgage loans6
serve to insulate most lending transactions from the common law
rule. Within a transaction subject to the rule, laymen and lawyers
not familiar with commercial real estate and lending law may likely
be under the impression that negotiation of a prepayment clause is
in furtherance of the lender's desire to limit the borrower's right to
prepay, rather than the creation of that right for the borrower.
This Comment first reviews the Promenade Towers opinion,
which involves an examination of an interesting line of Revolutionary
War era cases. The Comment then explores the legal bases for the
rule of perfect tender in time and the arguments both in support of
and critical of its operation. Finally, the Comment discusses issues
related to the validity and enforcement of contractual agreements
providing for prepayment limitations and penalties.
I. PROMENADE TOWERS MUTUAL HOUSING CORP. v.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Metropolitan) was the
holder of a consolidated note and deed of trust securing indebtedness
of approximately $23 million on The Promenade, an apartment
complex in Montgomery County, Maryland. 7 At the time of suit,
agreement."); id. § 12-1009(a) ("A consumer borrower may prepay a loan in
full at any time. ").
As a result of the Promenade Towers decision, the General Assembly of
Maryland enacted § 12-126 of the Commercial Law Code, which, in regard to
a loan "secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on the borrower's primary
residence" that "is not a commercial loan," provides that "[e]xcept to the
extent provided otherwise in the loan contract, a borrower may prepay all or
part of the outstanding unpaid indebtedness under [the] loan at any time."
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-126 (Supp. 1993).
6. No prepayment penalty may be charged on FHA and VA loans. See 24 C.F.R.
§ 203.22(b) (1993) (requiring FHA mortgages to allow prepayment in whole or
in part without payment of a prepayment charge); 38 C.F.R. § 36.4211(c)
(1993) (requiring that the debtor on a VA loan have the "right, without penalty
or fee, to prepay all or not less than one installment of the indebtedness at
any time"). FHLMC and FNMA do not purchase loans that contain prepayment penalty provisions. See ROBERT KRATOvn & RAYMOND J. WERNER,
MODERN MORTGAGE LAW & PRACTICE § 34.04(c) (2d ed. 1981).
7. This note and deed of trust represented the consolidation of two prior notes
and deeds of trust. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Promenade Towers Mut.
HOlls. Corp., 84 Md. App. 702, 706, 581 A.2d 846, 848 (1990) (Promenade
I). The original parties to the lending transactions were Landcon Associates
Phase One and Continental Illinois Realty. At the time of. consolidation in
1975, Continental's interest had been assigned to Metropolitan R. Extract at
E2-E3, Promenade Towers Mut. Hous. Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
324 Md. 588, 597 A.2d 1371 (1991) (Promenade II) (No. 91-2) [hereinafter
Record Extract].
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The Promenade was owned by Promenade Towers Mutual Housing
Corporation (PTMHC). The consolidated note and deed of trust had
been modified in 1980 (the First Modification) and in 1986 (the
Second Modification).8 The First Modification established an interest
rate of 141170, expressly prohibited prepayment until July 1, 1989, and
allowed prepayment without penalty after that date. 9 The Second
Modification reduced the interest rate to 11.875%, with payments to
be made until September 1996, at which time the remaining balance
would be due in full. There was no mention of prepayment in the
Second Modification. 1O The entire note was completely restated as
amended within each Modification. 1I The Second Modification additionally recited that the "[b]orrower hereby confirms and reaffirms
the terms, covenants and conditions of the Consolidated Note, as
amended hereby." Paragraph eight of the Second Modification states
the following:
That except as amended hereby, nothing herein contained
invalidates or shall impair or release any covenant, condition, agreement or stipulation in the Consolidated Note as
previously amended and Consolidated Deed of Trust as
previously amended, and the same, except as amended hereby,
shall continue to be in full force and effect .... "12
In January 1989, PTMHC informed Metropolitan of its intent
to exercise the prepayment privilege granted in the First Modification. 13 In response, Metropolitan asserted" that the Second ModifiThe facts as presented here are a compilation of information provided by
the opinions of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, Promenade [, 84
Md. App. at 705-07, 581 A.2d at 848-49, and the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, Promenade II, 324 Md. at 590-92, 597 A.2d at 1378-79. This
information is supplemented with information provided in the Complaint,
Record Extract, supra, at EI-E8, that was not contested in the Answer, Record
Extract, supra; at E47-E52.
8. Promenade [, 84 Md. App. at 706, 581 A.2d at 848. The First Modification
was between Promenade Associates, successor to Landcon Associates, and
Metropolitan; the Second Modification was between PTMHC, successor in title
to Promenade Associates, and Metropolitan. Record Extract, supra note 7, at
E4.
9. Promenade II, 324 Md. at 590, 597 A.2d at 1378. The interest rate was flXed
until June 1990. [d. From July 1990 until maturity in June 2005, the rate was
adjustable, subject to a 14070 floor. [d. The prepayment privilege required an
irrevocable 60 day written notice and payment of interest through the date of
" prepayment. [d.
10. [d. at 591, 597 A.2d at 1378.
11. [d.; see also Record Extract, supra note 7, at E9-E44 (providing a copy of
each Modification).
12. Promenade II, 324 Md. at 591, 597 A.2d at 1378.
13. [d. at 591, 597 A.2d at 1379.
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cation extinguished that privilege. 14 PTMHC then sought a declaratory
judgment and an injunction requiring Metropolitan to accept prepayment after July 1989.JS
The issue presented to the trial court was whether the prepayment
terms of the First Modification were incorporated by reference into
the Second Modification through the use of the reaffirmation and
continuance clauses, or whether the terms of the Second Modification
completely superseded those of the First, leaving the contract silent
on the issue of prepayment and thereby precluding PTMHC from
prepayment at will. Although both parties recognized that there was
no statutory or case law on point in Maryland, the initial pleadings
and motions did not challenge the applicability of the general rule
as to silence on the issue of prepayment. 16 Thus, the initial question
presented to the court was one of pure contract interpretation.
The trial court granted summary judgment to PTMHC, holding
that the First Modification was "not extinguished, but rather by
specific language in the second modification survive[d] and [was]
incorporated by reference" to the extent that there was not conflict,
and that silence in the Second Modification did not eliminate the
right of prepayment granted in the First Modification. 17 Acknowledging the gap in Maryland law and desiring to preserve all issues
for appeal, the court additionally held that even if the Second
Modification did not incorporate the prepayment privilege of the
First Modification, there is a right to prepay absent language in the
contract precluding prepayment. 18
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the trial
court on both issues. 19 The court first addressed the issue of contractual silence as to prepayment. The court reviewed the majority
14. [d. at 591-92, 597 A.2d at 1379.
15. [d.

16. Metropolitan acknowledged the lack of a Maryland statute or case law and
placed weight on the fact that a "majority of neighboring jurisdictions" follow
the majority rule with only one nearby jurisdiction, Pennsylvania, holding to
the contrary. Record Extract, supra note 7, at E77, E79 (citing case law from
New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Delaware, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to support the
majority rule). While agreeing that Metropolitan accurately stated the majority
rule, PTMHC maintained that the rule was inapplicable because the prepayment
provisions in the First Modification survived the Second Modification. [d. at
E115.
17. [d. at E150-E151 (ruling of the court).
18. [d. at EI51-EI53. The judge chose to rule in this fashion to "eliminate the
necessity of cross appeals in order to preserve that issue," despite the fact that
he considered the decision to be "adverse[] to what I believe the law is and is
going to be." [d.
19. "Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Promenade Towers Mut. Hous. Corp., 84 Md.
App. 702, 581 A.2d 846 (1990) (Promenade I).
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rule of perfect tender in time2° and the minority rule granting the
right to prepay absent express preclusion. 21 The few Maryland cases
relating to the prepayment issue, although not directly on point, were
discussed and determined to be consistent with the majority rule. 22
Finally, quoting a Washington State opinion to the effect that changes
in this area were more appropriately handled by the legislature than
the judiciary, the court adopted the majority rule. 23 The court then
quickly dealt with the issue of contract interpretation. The court
found that the Second Modification was not ambiguous and that the
terminology used should be given its ordinary meaning. The Modification stated that "[t}he Consolidated Note is hereby modified and
amended . . . [and} shall read and be deemed to read in full" as set
forth. As "amended" includes deletion and "in full" means "complete," the prepayment provision of the First Modification was
excluded from the Second Modification. 24
The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the decision of the
court of special appeals. 25 After reviewing the application of the rule
of perfect tender in time to both mortgage and land installment
contracts throughout the United States, the court discussed the precedential value of three cases decided by the court of appeals in the
1790's in favor of a defendant named Whetcroft. 26
In the first two of these cases, two creditors, McHard and
Quynn, sued for payment ori bonds issued by Whetcroft on September 24, 1778 in the amounts of 442 pounds and 10 shillings, plus
interest, due "at or upon" September 1, 1788.27 Whetcroft pleaded
that the debt had been paid28 based upon his tenders on March 7,
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 708-10, 581 A.2d at 849-50.
Id. at 710-13, 581 A.2d at 850-52.
Id. at 714-15, 581 A.2d at 852-53.
Id. at 715-16, 581 A.2d at 853.
Id. at 716-18, 581 A.2d at 853-54.
Promenade Towers Mut. Hous. Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 324 Md.
588, 591 A.2d 1377 (1991) (Promenade 11).
26. Id. at 592-602,597 A.2d at 1380-84. These three cases are McHard v. Whetcroft,
3 H. & McH. 85 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1791) (Whetcroft I); Quynn v. Whetcroft, 3
H. & McH. 136 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1793) (Whetcroft IJ); and Quynn v. Whetcroft,
3 H. & McH. 352 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1795) (Whetcroft III). Cases in Harris &
McHenry are reported based upon the date the case was heard in the General
Court (trial level). The trial and appellate decisions are combined. The amount
of information provided varies, but usually includes some factual background,
the decision, and sometimes an opinion of the general court, and the arguments
presented before the appellate court. Often, an appellate court opinion is not
provided. Thus, the holding of the appellate court must be inferred based upon
the judgment rendered and the arguments presented.
27. Whetcroft I, 3 H. & McH. at 85; Whetcroft II, 3 H. & McH. at 136; see also
Promenade II, 324 Md. at 599, 597 A.2d at 1382.
28. Whetcroft I, 3 H. & McH. at 85; Whetcroft II, 3 H. & McH. at 136; see also
Promenade II, 324 Md. at 599, 597 A.2d at 1382.
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1781 of $1,175.67 payment on each bond in the form of bills of
credit issued by the State of Maryland, which had been refused by
the creditors. 29 The general court rendered a verdict for the creditors
in both cases. 30 On appeal, the creditors' attorney argued that the
court should apply the common law rule that a payment or tender
made by the debtor before the date specified by contract is ineffectual
unless accepted by the creditor. 31 Whetcroft's attorney argued for
application of the civil law rule that a distant day of payment is for
the benefit of the debtor, not the creditor. 32 The court of appeals,
deciding both cases in the June term of 1794, reversed both general
court judgments. 33
Believing these reversals to signify that the court of appeals
allowed prepayment, Professor Frank S. Alexander cited the Whetcroft line of cases in his seminal article on mortgage prepayment34
to support his thesis that the rule of perfect tender in time is of
relatively recent development without settled historical foundation. 35
In turn, PTMHC asserted that the cases represented undisturbed
precedent establishing that Maryland follows the minority rule. 36 Both
Alexander's treatment and PTMHC's assertion rely upon the decisions in the first two Wheteroft cases (Wheteroft I and Wheteroft
II), and are based on the premise that decisions in the defendant's
favor mean that the court adopted the defendant's argument. That
Maryland follows the minority rule and permits prepayment is a
logical conclusion drawn from reading Wheteroft I and II.
The court of appeals, however, looked to the third Wheteroft
case (Wheteroft III) and developed an equally plausible alternative
explanation for the Wheteroft decisions. 37 The court first established
the historical context in which these Wheteroft cases were decided.
An act of the February 1777 session of the Maryland General

29. Promenade II, 324 Md. at 599-600, 597 A.2d at 1382-83.
30. Whetcro/t I, 3 H. & McH. at 85; Whetcro/t II, 3 H. & McH. at 137; see also
Promenade II, 324 Md. at 599, 597 A.2d at 1382.
31. Whetcro/t I, 3 H. & McH. at 87-88; see also Promenade II, 324 Md. at 599600, 597 A.2d at 1382-83.
32. Whetcro/t I, 3 H. & McH. at 88-90; Whetcro/t II, 3 H. & McH. at 137-38;
see also Promenade II, 324 Md. at 600, 597 A.2d at 1382-83.
33. Whetcro/t I, 3 H. & McH. at 91; Whetcro/t II, 3 H. & McH. at 139; see also
Promenade II, 324 Md. at 600, 597 A.2d at 1382-83.
34. Frank S. Alexander, Mortgage Prepayment: The Trial 0/ Common Sense, 72
CORNELL L. REv. 288, 302-03 (1987).
35. [d. at 290-308. Alexander ends his historical analysis with the conclusion that
"rc]ontrary to traditional wisdom, the common law prior to 1825 did not
clearly deny the debtor the right to prepay hjs mortgage." [d. at 308. For
Alexander's discussion of the Whetcro/t cases, see id. at 302-03, 305-06.
36. Promenade II, 324 Md. at 595, 597 A.2d at 1380.
37. [d. at 601-02, 597 A.2d at 1383-84.
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Assembly (the 1777 Act) provided that as of April 20, 1777, bills of
credit issued by Congress or by the state would be legal tender within
the state for payment of all types of debt. 38 In addition, the 1777
Act provided that a creditor refusing bills of credit tendered in
payment of a debt would be barred from suit on that debt and the
debt would be extinguished. 39 A debtor, having tendered and been
refused, was entitled to plead payment and introduce the 1777 Act
as evidence. 4O Acts such as these were passed by many states to help
stabilize economies hard hit by inflation during the Revolutionary
War.41 Unfortunately, the bills of credit legalized by the 1777 Act
were just as susceptible to inflation as the currency they replaced;
thus, during the October 1779 legislative session the bills were ordered
out of circulation as of March 20, 1781. 42 This 1779 Act provided
for exchange of the old bills of credit for new currency at a rate of
forty to one. 43 Whetcroft's March 7, 1781 tenders to his creditors
were made with the old, devalued bills of credit.44
The evidence provided in Whetcroft III established that Whetcroft had tendered, in succession, the exact same bills to creditor
Quynn as payment for each of three bonds held by Quynn; each
tender was refused. 4s Plaintiff Quynn argued that the tenders should
be valid against the first bond only and should not operate to
extinguish more debt than money tendered.46 The general court ruled
that because refusal of tender operated as payment so as to extinguish
the debt, the same money might then be used again to tender on the
second debt, and if again refused, to tender on the third-each tender
and refusal operating to discharge the debt tendered against with no
further obligation to the creditor,47
On appeal, Luther Martin,48 representing Quynn, contended that
the 1777 Act "established a new principle" in that it "made a tender

38. Id. at 596-97, 597 A.2d at 1381.
39. Id. at 597, 597 A.2d at 1381.
4O.Id.
41. Id. at 598, 597 A.2d at 1382.
42.Id.
43.Id.
44. Id. at 599, 597 A.2d at 1382.
45. Quynn v. Whetcroft, 3 H. & McH. 352, 352-53 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1795) (Whetcroft
Ill); see also Promenade II, 324 Md. at 600, 597 A.2d at 1383.
46. Whetcroft III, 3 H. & McH. at 353; see also Promenade II, 324 Md. at 600,
597 A.2d at 1383.
47. Whetcroft III, 3 H. & McH. at 353; see also Promenade II, 324 Md. at 600,
597 A.2d at 1383.
48. Luther Martin was one of the preeminent Maryland lawyers of the time. His
career has been summarized as follows:
MARTIN, Luther. 17481-1826. American lawyer and public official, b.
near New Brunswick, N.J. Practiced in Maryland (from c. 1772); first
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of money, and a refusal to receive, a payment . . . of the same
effect as if the money had been received," thus deprivin·g the creditor
of his debt. 49 Martin then argued that, having had the debt extinguished upon tender, the creditor should now be entitled at least to
the money previously tendered and refused, "which by law has been
forced upon him as an equivalent for [the debt] which was his due. "SO
Without recorded opinion, the court of appeals reversed the judgment
of the general court. 51
The (modern) court of appeals posited that the reversals in
Whetcroft I and II may not have represented the adoption of the
civil law rule allowing prepayment at the debtor's will. These reversals
instead could indicate the court's decision that a refused tender would
have the effect of payment arid would consequentially operate as the
creditor's acceptance of prepayment,which under the common law
extinguished a debt whether or not the debtor had the right to
prepay.52

49.
50.
51.
52.

attorney general of Maryland (1778-1805). Member, Continental Congress (1785) and Federal Constitutional Convention (1787); opposed
plan of strong central government and adoption of Constitution.
Defended Samuel Chase in impeachment trial before U.S. Senate
(1804) and Aaron Burr in treason trial in Richmond, Va. (1807).
Chief judge, court of oyer and terminer, Baltimore (1813-16); again
attorney general of Maryland (1818-22); losing prosecutor in McCulloch v. Maryland case (1819).
WEBSTER'S NEW BIOGRAPmCAL DICTIONARY 659 (1988).
Whetcrojt III, 3 H. & McH. at 355; see also Promenade II, 324 Md. at 600,
597 A.2d at 1383.
Whetcrojt III, 3 H. & McH. at 356; see also Promenade II, 324 Md. at 601,
597 A.2d at 1383.
Whetcrojt III, 3 H. & McH. at 356; see also Promenade II, 324 Md. at 601,
597 A.2d at 1383.
Promenade II, 324 Md. at 601-02, 597 A.2d at 1383-84. In a footnote, the
court observed that Whetcrojt II seemed to involve a parol evidence issue that
qlst little light on the issue at hand. Id. at 596 n.2, 597 A.2d at 1381 n.2.
Whetcrojt II does, however, appear to fit well with the hypothesis of the court.
The Whetcrojt II general court report indicates that Whetcroft offered to prove
a tender made in bills of credit before the date of payment specified in the
bond, and that such tender was a legal tender under the Act. Quynn v.
Whetcroft, 3 H. & McH. 136, 136-37 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1793) (Whetcrojt II). The
general court held that evidence would not be admitted to prove the facts
proffered because "no tender is legal, or can be admitted to be proved, before
the day of payment mentioned in the condition of the bond." Id. at 137. The
general court further held that the Act of October 1780 was of "no relation
to continental contracts, where the date of payment was after the continental
money was called out of circulation." Id.
On appeal, Whetcroft's attorney argued for the application of the civil
law on prepayment; Luther Martin, for Quynn, argued against the admission
of parol evidence. Id. at 137-39. The court of appeals reversed and remanded.
Id. at 139. The remand proceedings and subsequent appeal are reported as
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The court of appeals thus held that the Whetcroft cases did not
represent adoption of the civil law rule in Maryland, leaving Maryland's case law devoid of appellate precedent directly addressing the
issue of a mortgagor's right to prepay.53 The court noted, however,
that authorities on Maryland law, in accord with general treatises,
have long espoused perfect tender in time as the applicable rule in
Maryland. 54 The court further found the holding in a 1950 case
involving a disputed land sale contract to imply that Maryland
followed the common law rule. 55 The court also cited the recent
enactment of Commercial Law section 12-126, which grants the right
to prepay on non-commercial loans secured by the borrower's primary
residence, as representing the legislature's acknowledgement that Maryland follows the rule of perfect tender in time. 56 On these bases,

53.
54.
55.

56.

Whetero/t III. On remand, the general court instructed the jury that the same
money, tendered and refused on three different debts, operated to extinguish
each debt. Whetero/t /II, 3 H. & McH. at 353. Whetcroft's invocation of the
Act in Whetero/t /I; the significant change in the rulings of the general court
between Whetero/t /I and Whetero/t 1/1; and Luther Martin's focus upon the
effect of the Act in arguments before the court of appeals in Whetero/t 1/1,
combine to lend credibility to the theory that the decisions of the court of
appeals in Whetero/t I and /I were based upon interpretation of the Act rather
than upon an adoption of the civil law rule on prepayment.
Promenade II, 324 Md. at 602, 597 A.2d at 1383-84.
Id. at 602, 597 A.2d at 1384.
Id. at 602-03, 597 A.2d at 1384. Meinecke v. Goedeke, 195 Md. 373, 73 A.2d
445 (1950), involved a sale of 20 acres of land for $5000, at 6% interest, with
payments of $50/month. Upon payment in full, the sellers were to execute a
deed to the purchasers. Id. at 378, 73 A.2d at 446. Apparently there was
neither a maturity date, nor a provision for prepayment in the contract. The
contract was voidable at the sellers' option on 30 days default by the sellers.
Id. After having fallen several months behind in payment, the buyers gave the
sellers' attorney sufficient funds to bring the contract current. Id. at 380, 73
A.2d at 447. The attorney held the money while the parties argued about
whether the contract had been voided. The buyers sued for specific performance, requiring the sellers to accept either the remaining monthly payments or
the full remaining balance. Id. at 380-81, 73 A.2d at 447.
The court of appeals affirmed a circuit court decree ordering performance
of the contract as written, citing the sellers' refusal of the lump sum. Id. at
382-83, 73 A.2d at 448. The Promenade /I court read this holding to mean
that "[i)mplicitly, the purchasers had no right to prepay." Promenade /I, 324
Md. at 603, 597 A.2d at 1384.
Promenade II, 324 Md. at 603, 597 A.2d at 1384 (citing MD. CODE ANN.,
COM. LAW § 12-126 (Supp. 1991». This statute was introduced in direct response
to the court of special appeals decision in the Promenade I case. See Act of
May 14, 1991, ch. 409, 1991 Md. Laws 2499, 2499 (deleted "Whereas" clause).
This timing somewhat weakens the court of appeals' use of the statute to
support its finding that Maryland has long followed the common law rule of
perfect tender in time. Regardless of the opinions of various authorities as to
the state of Maryland law prior to the court of special appeals' ruling in
Promenade I, the law in Maryland became the rule of perfect tender in time
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the court held that "under Maryland common law, a mortgagor or
grantor under a deed of trust payable at a fixed date or dates in the
future, does not have a right to prepay, absent a provision for
prepayment in the loan contract. "57 The court declined PTMHC's
invitation to change Maryland common law by adopting the minority
rule. The court was neither persuaded by the reasoning of jurisdictions that have done so, nor willing to extend the presumption of
prepayment beyond the line so recently drawn by the legislature in
its enactment of Commercial Law section 12-126. 58
II.

PERFECT TENDER IN TIME

The rule of "perfect tender in time," considered to be the
general or majority rule 59 regarding mortgage prepayment. It is
recognized 60 as having its documented roots in two mid-nineteenth
century cases, Abbe v. Goodwin,61 an 1829 American case, and
Brown v. Co/e,62 an 1845 English case. The Abbe court rested its
refusal to allow early payment of two notes secured by a mortgage
on the premises that allowing the prepayment would amount to a
reformation of the mortgage contract, and that allowing the mortgagor to compel the mortgagee to accept early payment would be
akin to allowing the mortgagee to require the mortgagor to make
payment before maturity.63 The Brown court based its decision to
deny the mortgagor of a leasehold interest the right to repay a one
year note four months early upon the "inconvenience" such a practice
would impose upon mortgagees, who, the court said, "generally
advance their money as. an investment."64 Neither court cited precedent to support its reasoning or holding. Subsequently, other courts
throughout this country began to make similar determinations, either
citing to Abbe and Brown,65 or, as did the courts in those cases,

57.
58.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

65.

after that decision. The enactment of § 12-126 might then be viewed as a
reaction to what the legislature perceived as a change in the law.
Promenade II, 324 Md. at 603, 597 A.2d at 1384.
[d. at 604-06, 597 A.2d at 1384-85. The court also affirmed the court of special
appeals on the issue of contract interpretation, finding that the prepayment
clause of the First Modification was not incorporated into the Second Modification. [d. at 606-10, 597 A.2d at 1386-87.
See Promenade Towers Mut. Hous. Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 324
Md. 588, 597 A.2d 1377 (1991) (Promenade 11).
See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 422
(2d ed. 1985); Alexander, supra note 34, at 291.
7 Conn. 377 (1829).
14 L.J.-Ch. 167 (1845).
Abbe, 7 Conn. at 384.
Brown, 14 L.J.-Ch. at 168, quoted in Alexander, supra note 34, at 292; NELSON
& WHITMAN, supra note 60, at 422.
See cases cited in Alexander, supra note 34, at 292 n.19.
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after a general discussion without support of authority. 66 By the early
twentieth century, the rule of perfect tender in time was well established as common law in America. 67
The Abbe and Brown decisions reveal a dichotomy in the rationales used to support the rule of perfect tender in time. Abbe
represents a contract interpretation approach; Brown represents a
policy approach. Under either position, advocates of the rule view
the note as an investment vehicle for the lender.
There are two facets to the contract-based rationale. The first
operates upon the premise that a loan contract that specifies loan
amount, interest rate, term, and payments, is complete. 68 The note
is a contract under which the borrower, who has been advanced an
amount of money by the lender, agrees to repay that money under
certain conditions, generally over a certain period of time during
which interest on the unpaid balance must be paid. Time is thus an
important part of the creditor's expectation. 69 The borrower. has
received the benefit of the bargain-the use of the creditor's money.
A presumption of prepayment would deprive the creditor of his
benefit-the interest income for the term of the loan. A presumption
of prepayment in essence gives the debtor the right to unilaterally
change the term provision. 70 Any right, such as the right to prepayment, which gives one party the right to alter the contract at will
without approval of the other party, should be expressly given, not
implied in law. 71
66. See, e.g., Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 51 N.E. 309,
312 (N.Y. 1898) (denying a petition for early retirement of a bond issue secured
by a mortgage on the basis that as "[t)he outstanding bondholders have a
right to receive their debt only as provided by the contract ... [t)he obligation
of the debtor is to pay the principal when it becomes due, and he has no right
to compel the creditor to accept payment until it becomes due" without citing
to authority); see also Ellis J. Harmon, Comment, Secured Real Estate Loan
Prepayment and the Prepayment Penalt/. 51 CAL. L. REv. 923, 924 n.7 (1963)
(indicating that the prohibition against payment of a mortgage debt prior to
maturity "apparently based on the principle that a contract is enforceable
according to its terms, seems to have been adopted by the California Supreme
Court without discussion or citation of authority"). .
67. See Alexander, supra note 34, at 290-93, 308-10.
68. See F.D.I.C. v. Rusconi, 808 F. Supp. 30, 41-42 (D. Me. 1992) (finding that
absence of prepayment provision does not create ambiguity).
69. See, e.g., Peryer v. Pennock, 115 A. lOS, 105 (Vt. 1921) ("The time of payment
fixed by the terms of a pecuniary obligation is a material provision, and each
party has the right to stand on the letter of the agreement and perform
accordingly."). By contrast, the civil law rule presumes that the term provision
of a note is for the benefit of the obligor, and thus may be waived by the
obligor, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Spillman v. Spillman, 509
So. 2d 442 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
70. Arthur v. Burkich, 520 N.Y.S.2d 638, 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
71. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Promenade Towers Mut. Hous. Corp., 84
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The second contract-based rationale is grounded in the concept
of redprocity.72 In Whetcroft's time, the investment risk was a
fluctuating currency. McHard's attorney stated the creditor's argument well:
[Y]ou [the debtor] shall not tie my hands and be at liberty
to speculate on me and pay me at the lowest state of
depreciation to which paper money may be reduced; but as
you take the chance of a fall, give me the chance of its
rising in value. 73
The modern investment risk in a long term lending transaction is
fluctuating interest rates. The creditor takes the chance that interest
rates will rise, the debtor that interest rates will fall. Absent an
express contractual provision, the creditor is not permitted to demand
payment before it is due. On the same basis, the debtor should not
be allowed to anticipate the maturity date unless this right has been
provided in the note. 74
Other rationales for allowing the lender to refuse prepayment,
focus on policy considerations. 7s One argument for permitting the
lender to refuse prepayment is that the interest rate charged is, in
part, calculated to recoup the lender's up-front costs over the term
of the loan, so that early repayment would prevent the lender from
fully recovering these up-front costS.76 Further, prepayment could
result in additional unexpected costs related to reinvesting the funds

72.
73.

74.

75.

76.

Md. App. 702, 714, 581 A.2d 846, 852 (1990) (Promenade l) (citing Vincent
v. Palmer, 179 Md. 365, 372, 19 A.2d 183, 188-90 (1941), for the proposition
that "a party to a contract does not have any unilateral right to modify, and
courts may not redraft, an agreement merely because it turns out to be
disadvantageous").
See Alexander, supra note 34, at 307-08, 317-19; see also Alan M. Weinberger,
Neither an Early Nor a Late Payor Be?-Presuming to Question the Presumption Against Mortgage Prepayment, 35 WAYNE L. REv. I, 5 (1988).
McHard v. Whetcroft, 3 H. & McH. 85, 86-87 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1791) (Whetcroft
l); see also Brown v. Cole, 14 L.J.-Ch. 167 (1845) (acknowledging that allowing
prepayment "might be the cause of much loss to the [mortgagee), by the funds
falling during the time"), quoted in Alexander, supra note 34, at 292 n.18.
Alexander argues that the modern concept of reciprocity of contract terms is
actually a misconstruction of early decisions requiring reciprocity of remedies,
whereby upon payment, the mortgagor has the right to redeem his property,
and upon failure of payment, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose.
Alexander, supra note 34, at 307-08.
These economic arguments are also advanced to justify the imposition of
prepayment charges. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 60, at 423; Robert
K. Baldwin, Note, Prepayment Penalties: A Survey and Suggestion, 40 VAND.
L. REv. 409, 414-15 (1987); Michael T. McNelis, Comment, Prepayment
Penalties and Due-on-Sale Clauses in Commercial Mortgages: What Next?, 20
IND. L. REv. 735, 747-48 (1987).
Weinberger, supra note 72, at 14-15.
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received prior to maturity. 77 This type of argument generally is not
well received, due to the usual lending practice of charging origination
and processing fees to cover these costS.78
Other economic arguments center on the lender's management
of its loan portfolio. Generally, an institutional lender, such as a
bank, savings and loan, or insurance company, ties the interest paid
by the institution on its obligations, such as savings, certificates of
deposit, and annuities, to the income received by the institution on
its investments, including its mortgage portfolio. It is argued that
without the ability to control prepayments, the lender will lose the
ability to effectively maintain its portfolio yield. 79 As noted by one
commentator, "[p]resumptive nonprepayment and prepayment premiums protect and compensate lenders if they lose their anticipated
and bargained-for rate of return when borrowers prepay high interest
rate loans during low interest rate periods." so
Conversely, decisions and arguments supporting a presumptive
right to prepay tend to focus on a property analysis. In Mahoney v.
Furches,S) the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the relevant
policy considerations and determined that, in view of the importance
of free alienability of property, there should be a presumptive ability
to prepay, which could be refuted only by contract provisions or a
manifestation of mutual intent to the contrary.82 The implication that
77.
78.
79.
80.

Weinberger, supra; note 72, at 14-15; Alexander, supra note 34, at 311-12.
Weinberger, supra note 72, at 14.
See Weinbarger, supra, note 72 at 15-18; Alexander, supra note 34, at 312-17.
Weinberger, supra note 72, at 15. It could be argued that use of sophisticated
prepayment clauses that calculate a prepayment premium based upon current
market conditions would allow lenders to address this risk without resorting
to a presumptive prohibition against prepayment. Such provisions "calculate
the prepayment premium based on the prevailing market interest rate at the
time of prepayment, and the remaining term of the loan prior to maturity."
Weinberger, supra, note 72, at 17. By using such clauses, the lender is able to
protect itself against the portfolio-management risk without relying upon an
absolute prohibition against prepayment. This argument that the lender should
use a prepayment premium that is tailored to the market interest rate to some
extent begs the question because it does not address the issue of the silent
document. What the argument implies, however, is that the lender should be
responsible for including such a clause, and should be the party to suffer if
omitted. At least one recent decision recognized that the mortgagee is the usual
drafter of the instruments in question; and thus, a presumption of a right to
prepayment "would not work a hardship on the mortgagee." Mahoney v.
Furches, 468 A.2d 458, 461 (pa. 1983).
81. 468 A.2d 458 (Pa. 1983).
82. [d. at 460-61. The court considered that the effect on alienability of land was
the "dominant" consideration, as "the fundamental purpose of the mortgage
note in most instances is to secure a debt incurred in the purchase of land
from which the debt arises rather than to secure investment income for the
mortgagee." [d. at 461. Obviously, this concern about the alienability of land
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prepayment may be prohibited by agreement weakens the alienability
argument because, as pointed out by the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland in Promenade I, "an invalid restraint on alienation is
generally determined by the nature of the restraint, not by the manner
in which the restraint is created [and] the unreasonableness, if any,
of a restraint exists whether if is written or presumed. "83 The alienability argument is also undermined by the fact that although the
prepayment prohibition may make the transfer of the property less
economically feasible or less attractive to potential purchasers, it does
not actually prevent alienation. 84

focuses upon the debtor's perspective rather than upon the lender's, and ignores
the fact that these two purposes of a mortgage note, to secure a debt and to
secure investment income, may exist concurrently. See Promenade Towers Mut.
Hous. Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 324 Md. 588,604, 597 A.2d 1377,
1385 (1991) (Promenade II).
83. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Promenade Towers Mut. Hous. Corp., 84 Md.
App. 702, 712, 581 A.2d 846, 851 (1990) (Promenade I). The Pennsylvania
court's apparent deference to the parties' agreement is diminished by its
approving reference to a lower court's conclusion
that, consistent with the policy against restraints on alienation, even
where the mortgage explicitly states there is no right to prepay the
note, if the mortgagor can provide the mortgagee with the benefit of
his bargain under the terms of the note, he will be allowed to have
a release of his land following the substitution of security or other
arrangement.
Mahoney, 468 A.2d at 461 n.1. The alienability argument highlights the security
aspect of the mortgage transaction. Although the debt is often created in order
to facilitate the acquisition of the property, the debt is technically separable
from the property given as security. This severability of the debt from the
property is the basis for a "simple solution," proposed by Professor Alexander
to resolve the prepayment issue: The mortgagor obtains a release from a
mortgagee refusing prepayment by purchasing an annuity guarantying the
payments specified in the note. Alexander, supra note 34, at 336-41. Two
problems with Alexander's solution are that the loan is transformed from a
secured to an unsecured status, and the creditworthiness of the annuitant is
substituted for that of the mortgagor. That recourse to the property is an
integral facet of the mortgage transaction is not addressed by Alexander's
proposal.
84. See Warrington 611 Assocs. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 705 F. Supp. 229, 236
(D.N.J. 1989) (citing to cases holding "prepayment restrictions in the commercial context [are) enforceable and not violative of the policy against restraints on alienation"); Connolley v. Harrison, 23 Md. App. 485, 490-91, 327
A.2d 787, 790 (1974) (finding that neither a clause preventing prepayment for
two years, nor a clause requiring a prepayment penalty after that time "violated
the purpose for the rule against invalid restraints on alienation, i.e.,: neither
clause made the property 'extra commercium"'); Patterson v. Tirollo, 581
A.2d 74 (N.H. 1990) ("[T)he only restrictions placed on the plaintiffs were
that they were unable to prepay their note, and they were prevented from
having a subsequent grantee freely assume the mortgage held by the defendant.
Nothing, however, precluded the plaintiffs from selling their property in fee
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III.

BREACH BY PREPAYMENT
When the loan documents are silent on the issue of prepayment,
or prohibit or limit prepayment, a borrower subject to the rule of
perfect tender in time who wishes to prepay may find himself in a
curious situation if the lender is not receptive to early payoff. The
generally accepted remedy for breach of a loan contract by prepayment is specific performance, that is, the borrower is required to
continue payment according to the terms of the note. 8S Thus, although
it is a legal axiom that equitable relief is available only when there
is an inadequate remedy at law,86 and a loan contract, being a
contract for the payment of money, allows .for a calculation of
damages having a virtual identity to performance, the borrower is
not allowed to breach. Two Maryland cases, although not exactly
on point, illustrate the risks to the borrower of non-existent, shortsighted, or unartfully crafted prepayment rights.
Abell v. Safe Deposit & Trust CO.87 involved 1000 serially
numbered bonds with a par value of $1000 each, issued in January
1910 by the A.S. Abell Company (the Company), and secured by an
indenture of mortgage for $1,000,000 to Safe Deposit and Trust
Company of Baltimore as Trustee. The mortgage provided for redemption of twenty bonds a year in serial number order, with
redemption beginning in January 1915 and continuing each January
thereafter until the last bonds matured in 1965. 88 The redemption
clause specifically mandated that "the Company shall have no right
to pay any other bonds prior to maturity, except those hereafter
provided to be redeemed out of the unused proceeds of insurance."89
The insurance clause of the mortgage allowed the Company to apply
proceeds "to the payment and redemption of said bonds in the order
of their serial numbers."90
Over the years, in addition to redemption according to the
mortgage, the Company also purchased a number of bonds, so that

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

simple at any time to whomever they chose. They would just not be able to
give a warranty deed free from all encumbrances until after the two-year
promissory note became due without the consent of the mortgagee. "); see also
Baldwin, supra note 75, at 424 (discussing restraint on alienability challenges
to prepayment premiums).
See Weinberger, supra note 72, at 35 ("By enforcing the lender's right to
refuse tender, the traditional . common law rule grants the lender specific
performance. ").
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) ("Specific performance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to
protect the expectation interest of the injured party. ").
192 Md. 438, 64 A.2d 722 (1949).
[d. at 441, 64 A.2d at 723.
[d.
[d. at 442, 64 A.2d at 724.
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by the middle of 1947 there were only ninety-nine bonds outstanding. 91 At that time, approximately $108,000 in insurance proceeds
from a fire in late 1946 were deposited with the Trustee. 92 These
funds were used to purchase an additional sixty-four bonds, leaving
only thirty-five bonds outstanding, the majority of which were held
by the plaintiffs, individuals of the Abell family.93 The Company
attempted to redeem these remaining bonds under the insurance clause
of the mortgage. Although the plaintiffs refused to surrender their
bonds for redemption, the Trustee released the mortgage. 94
The court held that the Company did not have the right to
redeem the plaintiffs' bonds, and that the Trustee's release of the
mortgage was a violation of its fiduciary duty to the bondholders. 95
The mortgage was very specific on the terms of redemption and
allowed for no deviation-the timing and order of redemption was
controlled by the serial numbers on the bonds. The Company's
purchase of bonds did not alter the scheme for redemption, and the
purchased bonds could not be ignored in determining which bonds
were eligible for redemption under either the redemption or the
insurance clause of the mortgage. 96 The court refused to reinstate the
$1,000,000 mortgage to secure the plaintiffs' remaining thirteen bonds,
however, stating that the injury to the defendants from such a remedy
far outweighed the benefits to the plaintiffs. 97
Of interest is the court's discussion regarding an appropriate
remedy. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs were seeking specific
performance of the mortgage contract, and that "courts of equity
will not specifically enforce a contract unless ... the circumstances
surrounding a given case appeal to the conscience of the court. "98
In clearly identified dicta, the court ruminated on possible remedies
of which the plaintiffs might avail themselves to enforce their contractual right to hold their bonds until maturity and receive interest
when due. A suggested-approach was an action at law or in foreclosure for damages for breach of contract, "measured by the present
value of a bond of the same quality, e.g., a U.S. bond, and the

[d. at 443, 64 A.2d at 724.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 446, 64 A.2d at 726.
[d. at 444, 64 A.2d at 725. The last of plaintiffs' bonds would mature in
January 1957. [d. at 446, 64 A.2d at 726. While sufficient to cover payment
of all outstanding bonds, the insurance proceeds apparently were not sufficient
to reach the plaintiffs' bonds when the approximately 200 intervening purchased
but unredeemed bonds held by the company w~re considered. [d.
97. [d. at 447-48, 64 A.2d at 726-27.
98. [d. at 447, 64 A.2d at 726.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
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same 'yield' and maturity."99 But, the court said, "a court of equity
will not devise a remedy by injunction, or in the nature of specific
performance, which will harass or injure the Company and is not
necessary to protect bondholders against any actual threatened impairment of their security.' '100
The Abell case was referred to in Pierson v. Pyles, 101 a case
involving an installment land sales contract with payment provisions
structured in such a fashion that despite fifteen years of payments,
the contract balance was nearly $300 more than the original contract
amount. 102 As. the Pierson court was deciding a complaint for a
declaratory interpretation of a contract that had not been breached,
however, it applied the equity principle that a court may not permit
redrafting of the provisions of a contract in order to alleviate a bad
bargain by one of the parties. 103 The court held that the purchasers
must continue the monthly payments per the terms of the contract
even though it would take an additional thirty-seven years to achieve
unencumbered ownership.l04 The defendant, Pyles, was trustee for
the estate of the seller, and the court cited the Abell case for the
proposition that were Pyles to agree to a prepayment, he might be
breaching a fiduciary duty to the "estate. IDS
Thus, it seems that in Maryland, as the cooperation of either
the lender, in which case there is no breach,l06 or the trustee, who
risks suit for breach of fiduciary duty for accepting an unauthorized
prepayment, is required in order to breach, and the assistance of the
court cannot be drawn upon prior to an actual breach, the borrower,
subject to the rule of perfect tender in time, is in the unusual position
of being unable to breach the contract by prepayment. The alterna99.
100.
101.
102.

103.

104.

105.
106.

Id. at 448, 64 A.2d at 727.
Id.
234 Md. 119, 197 A.2d 890 (1964).
Id. at 121, 197 A.2d at 891. The contract, dated June 13, 1946, provided for
a starting balance $14,935, interest at 4070, monthly payments of $65, with no
right to anticipate payments. Id. Once the balance had decreased by $5000, a
deed would be executed and a mortgage taken back on the same terms. Id.
On these terms, the buyers would have been entitled to a deed in seven and
one-half years, and the full balance would have been paid in slightly over 36
years. However, the contract also provided for payment of taxes and insurance
from the monthly payment. Id. Over the years, the tax assessment increased
to the point that there was no amortization of the balance. Id. at 121-22, 197
A.2d at 891.
Id. at 123, 197 A.2d at 892. The court did affirm the lower court ruling that
the contract could be interpreted to allow the separate payment of taxes and
insurance. Id. at 123-24, 197 A.2d at 892.
Id. at 123, 197 A.2d at 892.
Id. at 125, 197 A.2d at 893.
See Carlyle Apartments Joint Venture v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 333 Md. 265,
274, 635 A.2d 366, 370 (1994).
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tives are to breach the contract through default or other violation
and then pay the loan when the creditor accelerates (assuming that
the creditor would choose to accelerate rather than' sue on each
individual payment); purchase the property in foreclosure; or forfeit
the property: The disadvantages of these options are obvious. From
the borrower's standpoint there is harm to his credit rating and a
risk of losing his investment and appreciation in the property. 107
From the creditor's standpoint, there is the likelihood that, if forced
to recognize the default, recovery would be limited to the principal
balance, accrued interest, and costs, not the expectation damages he
would have received had a breach by prepayment been allowed. lOS
IV.

THE PREPAYMENT CLAUSE
The Promenade Towers decision and the inherent difficulty in
breaching a loan contract by prepayment make negotiation of prepayment terms essential for the non-residential borrower lO9 in Maryland. Careful planning of prepayment provisions is also important
for the lender, however, as the case law llo presents a strange paradox.
Despite the general rule that there is no prepayment unless provided
for in the loan documents, courts have tended to subject prepayment
. clauses to exacting standards, and on occasion, have not been hesitant
to strike a negotiated clause, leaving the borrower with an unhindered
right to prepay.
107. See, e.g., Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 568
(9th Cir. 1988) ("[Dlefaults are messy things; they are supposed to be. ").
108. Clearly it is to the benefit of both parties to negotiate and come to terms
when the mortgagor wishes to prepay. One commentator has noted, however,
that although the rule of perfect tender in time prevents prepayment at the
mortgagor's initiative when the loan documents are silent, some states statutorily
prohibit collection of a prepayment fee unless provided for in the loan contract.
The lender is thus left with no compromise position. Baldwin, supra note 75,
at 413-14.
109. Maryland's Commercial Law Code, § 12-126, enacted in reaction to the Promenade Towers decision, provides that on a non-commercial loan secured by a
borrower's primary residence, the borrower may prepay all or part of the
unpaid balance at any time "except to the extent expressly provided otherwise
in the loan contract." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-126 (Supp. 1993). A
commercial loan is defined as a loan "made solely to acquire or carryon a
business or commercial enterprise" or made "to any business or commercial
organization." [d. § 12-101(c) (1990). Thus, the protection of the statute does
not reach loans made to individuals for business purposes, or loans secured
by properties other than the borrower's primary residence, such as second or
vacation homes. In these instances, the borrower must negotiate prepayment
rights or be subject to the rule of perfect tender in time.
110. Except as previously discussed, there is no Maryland case law addressing the
interpretation and enforcement of prepayment clauses. The discussion that
follows surveys cases from across the country in an effort to highlight the
national trends and some of the more predominant approaches to analysis.
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Generally, prepayment clauses establish if and when prepayment
is to be permitted, and how the prepayment premium, if any, is to
be cafculated. III The drafting of prepayment clauses has evolved over
the years. Initially, such clauses tended to restrict prepayment for a
number of years, and then allowed prepayment upon payment of an
additional percentage of either the original loan amount or the then
outstanding balance. Often the required percentage was decreased
over time. 1l2 The arbitrary nature of these clauses earned them the
nomenclature of "prepayment penalties." The penalty was not calculated to have any relation to the harm to the lender in the event
of prepayment; the percentage fee was stated within the loan documents and did not vary according to the prevailing market. Thus, a
lender would collect the fee even though interest rates had risen and
the lender was actually advantaged by the prepayment.
The modern trend is to use instead what has been termed a
"yield equivalent" or "make whole" formula. JJ3 In this type of
clause, the prepayment fee is tied to an objective measurement of
current interest rates, such as United States Treasury Bonds. In the
event of prepayment, the borrower is required to provide the lender
with the amount that is necessary to purchase bonds providing the
same yield and maturity as the prepaid loan. 114 An alternative formula
calculates the difference between the contract yield and the current
yield on a specified investment, such as United States Treasury Notes,
of the same maturity, and requires the borrower to pay the present
value of the interest differential applied to the outstanding balance. liS
Under either of these formulas, the borrower pays only if interest
rates have fallen below 'the contract rate; a penalty is not extracted
if the lender benefits from the prepayment. 1I6
Ill. The silent loan contract has been referred to as a "non-option" prepayment,
as distinguished from the "option" prepayment where the prepayment terms
are specified in the loan documents. Williams v. Fassler, 167 Cal. Rptr. 545,
547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
112. Thomas C. Homburger & Matthew K. Phillips, What You See Is Not Always
What You Get: The Enforceability of Loan Prepayment Penalties, 23 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 65, 66 (1989); Debra P. Stark, Enforcing Prepayment
Charges: Case Law and Drafting Suggestions, 22 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
549, 552-53 (1987); Weinberger, supra note 72, at 16-17.
113. See Chester L. Fisher, III, Make-Whole Prepayment Premiums Under Attack,
45 Bus. LAW. 15, 17-18 (Nov. 1989); Homburger & Phillips, supra note 112,
at 67; Stark, supra note 112, at 553; Weinberger, supra note 72, at 17-18.
114. See Stark, supra note 112, at 553; see also Warrington 611 Assocs. v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 705 F. Supp. 229, 234 (D.N.J. 1989) (defining "yield maintenance
fee").
115. See Weinberger, supra note 72, at 17.
116. There has been some criticism of the selection of U.S. Government obligations
as the measuring standard. See: e.g., In re Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. 500 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1987) (stating that because government securities are lower risk
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Challenges to loan contract clauses providing for a fee in the
event of prepayment have generally focused on two elements: the
validity of the imposition of any prepayment premium at all, and,
if allowed, the validity of the method used to calculate the prepayment fee.

A.

The Validity oj the Imposition oj a Prepayment Premium

Objectively, the lender should receive the negotiated prepayment
charge regardless of the circumstances of prepayment. Courts, however, have utilized both contract interpretation and equity principles
to deny the lender the charge when prepayment is deemed beyond
the borrower's control. There are four general situations which lead
to prepayment: (1) condemnation of the property; (2) receipt of
insurance proceeds upon destruction of the improvements; (3) the
lender's acceleration of the loan under the terms of the contract; and
(4) a prepayment initiated by the borrower due to a refinance or sale
of the property. Of these, the lender's position is sound only in the
last instance.1l7 The lender is least likely to collect a prepayment fee
in the event of prepayment as a result of condemnation or insurance
compensation, and the ability to collect in the event of acceleration
is dependent upon careful drafting of the prepayment provisions.
1.

Condemnation

In condemnation or eminent domain proceedings, the government is required to reimburse the landowner for the property taken
based upon an appraisal of the fair market value of the property. 118
Under Maryland law, mortgagees are parties to the condemnation
suit. 119 Mortgage contracts ordinarily require the application of condemnation proceeds to the principal balance of the loan on the theory
that the security for the loan has been reduced. l20 The reported cases
investments commanding lower rates, calculations based upon these securities
overcompensate the lender); see also infra note 177. But see Debra P. Stark,

Prepayment Charges in Jeopardy: The Unhappy and Uncertain Legacy of In
re Skyler Ridge, 24 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 191, 196-97 (1989) (addressing
the Skyler Ridge court's criticism).
117. See Homburger & Phillips, supra note 112, at 70.
118. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 12-104(a), 12-105(b), 12-207(c) (1988).
See generally RICHARD A. REID, CONDEMNATION & EMINENT DOMAIN (1988).
119. A proceeding for condemnation is to be brought against all parties who have
an interest in the property to be condemned. MD. R. U4(b) (1993). If such a
party is not designated in the petition for condemnation, there is no transfer
of that party's interest to the condemnor. Department of Nat. Resources v.
Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 521 A.2d 313 (1986).
120. See KRATOvn. & WERNER, supra note 6, § 6.07; see also JACOB RABKIN &
MARK H. JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL FORMS, Form 21.78, at 21-5101 (1993).

[Vol. 22
show a reluctance to enforce prepayment charges in this situation. 121
lola Corp. v. Berkeley Savings & Loan Ass'n l22 is an excellent
example. The prepayment clause at issue in that case, which provided
for a prepayment fee if the loan was prepaid during the first five
years of the loan, spoke of the mortgagor's "right and privilege" to
prepay.123 Condemnation proceeds were released to the first mortgagee, who paid the second mortgagee, retained an amount sufficient
to cover the outstanding balance, accrued interest, and a prepayment
fee, and forwarded the remainder to the mortgagor. 124 The mortgagor
sued for recovery of the prepayment charges withheld. 125 The court
held that the prepayment occurred by operation of law rather than
by exercise of a right or privilege by the mortgagors. 126 The prepayment clause, as worded, was found not to contemplate prepayment
due to condemnation; the court indicated that the mortgage should
specifically provide for this event.J27
The mortgagee in Village of Rosemont v. Maywood-Proviso
State Bank l28 thought it was providing for this contingency with a
mortgage clause that gave the mortgagor the right to either prepay,
including a prepayment fee, or provide substitute security in the event
the mortgagor "shall (whether voluntarily or by operation of law)
sell, convey, assign, mortgage, hypothecate, or otherwise transfer or
encumber the mortgaged premises."129 The court found the clause to
be ambiguous because although it provided for payment upon transfer
by operation of law, it was prefaced by operative words requiring
mortgagor action. The court concluded that "in the event of condemnation, performance of a prepayment penalty clause will be
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121. See generally Vicki A. Huffman, Annotation, Compensation jor Interest Prepayment Penalty in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 84 A.L.R.3D 946 (1978 &
Supp. 1993).
122. 250 A.2d 150 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969).
123. Id. at 151-52.
124. Id. at 151.
125. Id. at 152.
126. Id. at 154.
127. Id. at 154-55. Accord Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1954)
(denying mortgagee interest for remaining term of note upon condemnation
payoff of loan without prepayment privilege, as condemnation law existed at
time of contracting and could have been provided for in loan contract);
Associated Schs., Inc. v. Dade County, 209 So. 2d 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1968) (relying upon Shavers to deny contractual prepayment penalty where
property was taken by eminent domain).
128. 501 N.E.2d 859 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). The caption of the case refers to the
condemnation action. Maywood-Proviso State Bank, in a trustee capacity, was
the owner/mortgagor in this instance; the appeal was brought by the mortgagee,
Lyons Savings and Loan Association, which was contesting the court-ordered
distribution of the condemnation proceeds. Id. at 860.
129. Id.
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excused unless there is clear language which expressly delineates
payment of a premium upon condemnation. "130 Thus, to be certain
of the ability to collect a prepayment premium in condemnation
cases, lenders should not rely upon blanket provisions, but should
require that the mortgage documents expressly state that such a fee
is payable in the event of condemnation. 131
Arguments that the condemning government should be liable for
the prepayment premium, either to the mortgagee directly or as part
of the mortgagor's just compensation award as a loss incidental to
the condemnation, have been unsuccessful. The court in lola Corp.
found such a claim to be "frivolous .... A prepayment charge as
here claimed is not a factor to be considered in arriving at fair value
nor is it an element of damage incidental to the taking." 132 Similarly,
on the grounds that just compensation is based upon the fair market
130. Id. at 862. The court further found that the prepayment provision of the note
"evinces an intent to enforce the penalty only if Maywood chooses to prepay."
Id. A similar approach was used in Landohio Corp. v. Northwestern Mut.
Life Mortgage & Realty Investors, 431 F. Supp. 475 (N.D. Ohio 1976), to hold
that prepayment resulting from a sale under threat of condemnation did not
amount to the mortgagor's exercise of a "privilege" to prepay.
In the case of DeKalb County v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 219 S.E.2d
707,710 (Ga. 1975), the court's approach was less logical. The note in question
prohibited prepayment during the first five years of the loan and provided for
a sliding percentage premium for prepayments thereafter. Id. at 708-09. The
court held that no premium was payable on a prepayment due to condemnation
during the prohibition period, stating that "it cannot be contended that [the
lender] is claiming a premium for the exercise of a right bargained for with
the [borrower, as the borrower] had no right whatsoever to prepay for a period
of five years from the date of the making of the note." Id. at 710. The
resulting inference, that had the condemnation occurred in year six the lender
would have been entitled to the prepayment premium, directly contradicts the
relative rights of the parties at the times involved.
131. Only one case involving a contractual provision for prepayment due to condemnation is noted in Huffman's annotation. Huffman, supra note 121, at
951 (citing In re Brooklyn Bridge Southwest Urban Renewal Project, 260
N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965». That case involved, not a prepayment
premium per se, but a contract provision specifying that the mortgagor would
be responsible for payment of the difference between the 6070 note rate and
the 40/0 interest rate which the condemning body was required to pay by statute.
Brooklyn Bridge, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 231. As the contract provision did not
involve an increased payment by the condemnor, but merely determined the
apportionment of the condemnation proceeds between the property owner and
the mortgagee, the court declined to interfere with the contract. Id. at 232-33.
132. Jala Corp. v. Berkeley Sav. & Loan, 250 A.2d 150, 154-55 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1969). The court, in Jala Corp., cited Knoxville Hous. Auth., Inc.
v. Bush, 408 S.W.2d 407 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966), for the proposition that a
prepayment charge should not be considered in arriving at fair value or damage
incidental to the taking. Jola Corp., 250 A.2d at 155. It should be noted that
in Bush, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee clearly limited the issue to one of
statutory interpretation. Bush, 408 S. W .2d at 410-11.
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value of the condemned property and is not related to apportionment
of the condemnation award, the court in Village of Rosemont rejected
the mortgagee's assertion that it had been deprived of the ability to
protect its right to the prepayment premium by its exclusion from
an agreement reached by the mortgagor and the Village. 133
2.

Insurance Proceeds

In Chestnut Corp. v. Bankers Bond & Mortgage CO.,134 a case
influencing the decision in Jala Corp., I3S a clause attaching a premium
to the "right" to prepay was given a narrow construction to deny
the premium when the mortgage was paid according to the terms of
an insurance policy following destruction of the improvements by
fire.136 Assessing the position of both the lender and the owner of
the property, the court concluded that "[i]n such a situation both
parties suffer, but the owner suffers most." 137 As such, given that
"[n]either the bond nor the mortgage specifically or expressly provide[d] for the exact situation which ha[d] arisen," the mortgagee
was not entitled to the prepayment premium. 138 Thus, courts generally
hold that when outside forces, such as condemnation or fire, cause
early repayment of the loan, the loss of expected interest income on
the contract should be borne by the mortgagee, unless that risk has
been unequivocally assigned to the mortgagor within the loan contract.
3.

Acceleration

When prepayment is due to the mortgagee's acceleration l39 of
the loan, the cases are less settled. Although the recent trend is
otherwise, courts have generally viewed an acceleration as a voluntary
act of the mortgagee. When acceleration is optional rather than selfexecuting, the mortgagee has been held to forfeit the right to a
prepayment premium when the right to accelerate is exercised. l40 The
133. Village of Rosemont v. Maywood-Proviso State Bank, 501 N.E.2d 859, 862
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
134. 149 A.2d 48 (Pa. 1959).
135. See lala Corp., 250 A.2d at 153.
136. Chestnut Corp., 149 A.2d at 50.
137. [d.
138. [d.
139. Most mortgage loans provide for acceleration when the mortgagor transfers
the property, commonly known as a due on sale clause, or when the mortgagor
defaults. When a loan is accelerated the full balance of the loan is due and
payable immediately, rather than on the stated maturity date.
140. The primary theory behind denying prepayment premiums upon acceleration
is that there is technically no prepayment because the full balance is presently
due.
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rationale that the mortgagee forfeits the prepayment premium upon
acceleration has been applied even when the loan is accelerated as a
result of the borrower's failure to abide by the terms of the contract.
An early case, holding that the mortgagee forfeits the prepayment
premium, was Kilpatrick v. Germania Life Insurance Co., 141 in which
the mortgagee began foreclosure proceedings after the mortgagor's
default. When the mortgagor, who was able to secure other financing,
subsequently tendered the full balance, the mortgagee halted the
foreclosure proceedings, but refused to accept the payment unless
the contractual prepayment 'bonus' was included. 142 The court stated
that the mortgagee's election to consider the debt due became irrevocable upon the mortgagor's assumption of other legal obligations
in reliance on the mortgagee's actions. 143 The prepayment was thus
found to have been involuntary, and the court allowed the mortgagor
to recover the amount of the bonus. l44
Later cases place little or no emphasis upon the mortgagor's
reliance. In addition to a prepayment clause, the mortgage in Slevin
Container Corp. v. Provident Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n l4S contained a due on sale clause that prohibited the sale of the property
without the mortgagee's approval. In the event of such a sale, the
mortgagee had the option to increase the interest rate, accelerate the
loan, or implicitly, continue to accept monthly payments. l46 After
learning of an unapproved sale, the mortgagee chose to accelerate
the loan. 147 The court, finding acceleration to have been the mortgagee's voluntary decision, held that the payment was a payment
made after maturity; therefore, the mortgagee was not entitled to a
prepayment premium. l48 This rationale was also applied in In re LHD
Realty Corp. 149 to deny a prepayment premium to a mortgagee whose
acceleration of the mortgage debt took the form of a petition for
relief from the bankruptcy automatic stay to allow foreclosure proceedings. lso
141. 75 N.E. 1124 (N.Y. 1905).
142. Id. at 1125.
143. Id.

144. Id. at 1125-26.
145. 424 N.E.2d 939 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
146. Id. at 939-40.
147. Id. at 940.
148. Id. at 940-41; see also Baldwin, supra note 75, at 415-19 (discussing the
combination of due on sale and prepayment clauses).
149. 726 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1984).
150. Id. at 331. Filing a petition for relief from the automatic stay is a voluntary
acceleration of the debt by the creditor distinct from the automatic acceleration
of the debt upon the filing of bankruptcy. See In re Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R.
500, 507 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) ("The automatic acceleration of a debt upon
the filing of a bankruptcy case is not the kind of acceleration that eliminates
the right to a prepayment premium. ").
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In Imperial Coronado Partners v. Home Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n,m however, the court allowed the mortgagee to collect the
prepayment fee, reasoning that the mortgagor had failed to exercise
options available to halt the acceleration. m Under California law,
the mortgagor had the right to reinstate the loan by curing the
default; under federal Bankruptcy law, the mortgagor could decelerate the loan.IS3 Because the mortgagor made a conscious decision
instead to sell the property, the court found that the payoff was
voluntary. 154
In this same vein, courts have emphasized that a mortgagor
cannot avoid a contractual prepayment fee on the basis that the loan
was paid off in anticipation of an expected acceleration. In First
Indiana Federal Savings Bank v. Maryland Development Co. ISS the
court established a standard of requiring a clear and unequivocal
exercise of the acceleration option by the lender before the prepayment fee is forfeited. ls6 A refusal to consent to an assumption is not
sufficient,IS7 nor is a voluntary payoff prior to sale of the mortgaged
property made involuntary by the lender's expressed intention to
accelerate the loan in exercise of a due on sale clause. ISS
Recent cases reflect a willingness to enforce prepayment premiums when the draftsmanship manifests attention to the concerns
expressed in earlier decisions.ls9 When the prepayment provision is
specific as to applicability upon acceleration, the premium has been
upheld. l60 Failure to be precise can be fata4 however. For instance,
despite strong evidence of a deliberate default, the court in Ferreira
v. Yared l61 required the refund of a prepayment premium paid upon

151.
152.
153.
154.
ISS.
156.
157.
158.

96 B.R. 997 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1000.
Id.
Id.
509 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 257.
Id.
First Nat'l Bank of Springfield v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United
States, 510 N .E.2d 518, 523 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
159. See Debra P. Stark, New Developments in En/orcing Prepayment Charges
A/ter an Acceleration 0/ a Mortgage Loan, 26 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
213, 215-16, 224-26 (1991).
160. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Corporex Properties, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 423,
428 (E.D. Ky. 1992) (finding prepayment provision entitling lender to premium
upon default and acceleration "computed as if a voluntary prepayment had
been made on the date of such acceleration" enforceable); In re Schaumburg
Hotel, 97 B.R. 943, 953 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (enforcing prepayment premium
due "whether said payment is voluntary or the result of prepayment created
by the exercise of any acceleration clause after a default").
161. 588 N.E.2d 1370 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
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a refinance to avoid foreclosure. As to the equities involved, the
court stated:
It is not lost on us that a borrower may evade a· lawfully
agreed to prepayment penalty by embarking on a course of
conduct which provokes acceleration of the note. Indeed,
that may have occurred here. There are, however, often
risks and costs attendant upon default in a mortgage note
and, on balance, it strikes us as the better course to adopt
the majority view that, unless the note otherwise provides,
a holder of a note cannot simultaneously accelerate the note
and collect a prepayment penalty. 162

B.

The Validity oj the Amount oj the Prepayment Premium
Evaluation of the amount of the prepayment premium will
depend upon the characterization of the nature of the premium.
There are three approaches that may be taken: The premium can be
treated as consideration for relinquishment of the right to insist upon
payment as scheduled, as a bargained-for contractual term, or as
liquidated damages. How the premium is viewed depends, in part,
upon the structure of the prepayment right. Where the loan contract
provides no right at all, a later agreement reached between the parties
to allow prepayment generally results in treatment of the prepayment
premium as consideration in exchange for the contract modi fication. 163 Where the loan contract provides the right to prepay in
162. Id. at 1371-72; see also Stark, supra note 159, at 229-31 (discussing intentional
default). But see Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d
564, 567 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting argument that mortgagor can precipitate a
default and insist on acceleration by tendering balance due plus prepayment
fee where note prevented prepayment for initial 12 years of loan, but provided
for 10070 prepayment premium for prepayment resulting from default).
Another example of strained reasoning to reach a result favorable to the
mortgagor is Clinton Capital Corp. v. Straeb, 589 A.2d 1363 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1990), where in disallowing a prepayment premium to ·be paid
"whether prepayment is voluntary or involuntary, including any prepayment
made after exercise of any acceleration provision," id. at 1364, the court
construed "involuntary" to mean "actions of third parties which force the
payment of the mortgage prematurely." Id. at 1371. In a non sequitur, the
court then stated that "[this) is not the situation that exists on the facts in
this case ... none of the defendants have taken action to force [the lender)
to accelerate the mortgage [to) avoid a prepayment penalty." Id. The court's
primary concern seems to be the effect of the 10% prepayment premium, when
combined with a default interest rate of 24%, upon the mortgagor's ability to
redeem the property. Id. A liquidated damages analysis would have been the
more appropriate approach to reach the equitable result the court desired,
while avoiding a convoluted construction of the prepayment provision.
163. See Baldwin, supra note 75, at 420.
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exchange for a specified premium, the premium usually will be treated
as a bargained-for contractual term when prepayment is voluntary.l64
Under either of these evaluations, the premium generally is subject
to nullification only if it is determined to be unconscionable. 165
When the premium becomes due upon a prepayment occasioned
by the mortgagor's default, however, courts often subject the premium to a liquidated damages analysis. l66 Under this analysis, if the
premium is considered to be a penalty for breach, rather than a
reasonable estimate of damages, the prepayment clause will not be
enforced. 167 In decisions which caused some controversy,l68 the bankruptcy courts of the central district of California and the western
district of Missouri used a liquidated damages approach to invalidate
two yield maintenance clauses. l69 Although it should be noted that
164. See Baldwin, supra note 75, at 421-23 (citing court characterizations of option
prepayment clauses as giving the mortgagor the ability to choose between
alternative performances); see also West Raleigh Group v. Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 809 F. Supp. 384, 391 (B.D. N.C. 1992) (rejecting claim that
yield differential prepayment clause was unenforceable liquidated damages
provision as the prepayment premium was "bargained-for consideration for
the option to prepay, and as such it is enforceable as a matter of contract law
and not as a measure of damages"); Renda v. Gouchberg, 343 N.E.2d 159,
160 (Mass. App. Ct. 1976) (rejecting liquidated damages analysis as "the
plaintiffs' prepayment constituted a voluntary election on their part").
165. See Stark, supra note 112, at 550 n.7 and accompanying text. But see In re
A.J. Lane Co., 113 B.R. 821, 827-28 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (arguing that
prepayment is not a "true" alternative performance, and that liquidated
damages analysis is, therefore, the proper approach for all prepayment clauses).
166. Baldwin, supra note 75, at 423.
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) ("Damages for breach by
either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount that is
reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach
and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated
damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty. "); see also
Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co., 319 Md. 324, 354, 572 A.2d 510, 525 (1990);
Schrier v. Beltway Alarm Co., 73 Md. App. 281, 289-90, 533 A.2d 1316, 1320
(1987). It should be noted that the common characterization of the prepayment
fee as a "prepayment penalty" is not related to a liquidated damages analysis,
and the parties' choice of terminology within the document should not be
determinative. See West Raleigh Group v. Massachusetts Life Ins. Co., ~09 F.
Supp. 384, 390-91 (B.D.N.C. 1992); see also Traylor v. Grafton, 273 Md; 649,
661, 332 A.2d 651, 660 (1975) (stating that nomenclature used by the parties
is not determinative of whether payment is a penalty).
168. See Fisher, supra note 113; Stark, supra note 116.
169. See In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 88 B.R. 997 (Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1988); In re
Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. 500 (Bankr.. C.D. Cal: 1987). In Skyler Ridge, the court
invalidated a yield maintenance clause which required payment of the differential between the note rate and a comparable U.S. Treasury note yield, with
a floor payment of 1% of the principal balance. Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. at 505.
The court found the failure to adjust for the normal difference in rate between
first mortgages and Treasury notes; the lack of a discount for present value;
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in each of these cases the mortgagee was to receive full payoff of
the principal balance owed, and as the courts frankly admitted,
payment of any prepayment premium would have either frustrated
the implementation of an otherwise feasible plan of reorganization,I7O
or would have precluded the claims of other secured creditors against
the proceeds of the property, 171 the willingness of the court to
invalidate a negotiated prepayment charge in a contract between two
sophisticated parties is significant.
A clause calling for a fixed one percent prepayment premium
has also been invalidated under a liquidated damages analysis. 172 The
court in In re A.J. Lane & Co. found the clause to be unreasonable
both in light of the lender's anticipated loss, because a loss was
presumed, and in light of the lender's actual loss, because interest
rates at the time of prepayment were in fact higher than the note
rate. 173 Although it seems that the answer to the court's concerns
would be to use a properly formulated yield maintenance clause. The
court also stated that the prerequisite finding of difficulty of proof
of loss necessary to uphold a liquidated damages provision could not
be made in the prepayment situation because the common usage of
such formulas demonstrates that the damage formula is "simple and
well-established.' '174 This characterization has been subsequently crit.
icized as being over-simplistic. 17s
The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently addressed a mortgagor's challenge of the validity of a premium charged in connection
with the mortgagor's voluntary prepayment of its commercial loan

170.
171.
172.
173.

174.

175.

and the failure to amortize the floor payment, which the lender justified as
recoupment of transaction costs over the life of the loan to be unreasonable,
and thus totally unenforceable under the common law. Id. at 506. The Kroh
Brothers court, using Skyler Ridge as precedent, invalidated a similar provision
on the same grounds.
Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. at 503.
Kroh Bros., 88 B.R. at 999.
In re A.l. Lane & Co., 113 B.R. 821 (D. Mass. 1990).
Id. at 829. But see In re Schaumburg Hotel Owner Ltd. Partnership, 97 B.R.
943 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (upholding 10070 prepayment premium as reasonable
estimate of damages where actual losses exceeded that amount).
A.J. Lane, 113 B.R. at 829. The court characterized the formula as "the
difference in the interest yield between the contract rate and the market rate
at the time of prepayment, projected over the term of the loan and then
discounted to arrive at present value." Id.
See In re Financial Ctr. Assoc. of East Meadow, L.P., 140 B.R. 829, 836-37
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding the A.J. Lane formula to be "a general
description of the factors to be included in a proper approach which at best
may only provide an appropriate range within which a particular result may
be considered appropriate," and answering the query "does the mere existence
of a workable formula mandate a conclusion that damages are easily determinable" in the negative).
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in Carlyle Apartments Joint Venture v. AIG Life Insurance CO.176
The loan documents permitted the mortgagor to prepay the loan in
full after the first year of the five-year term and provided for a
prepayment premium "equal to the difference in yield between the
Loan . . . and a Treasury Note in the amount of the prepayment
proceeds with a term equal to the remaining term of the Loan. "177
The mortgagor sought to have the court declare the prepayment
premium clause void as a liquidated damages clause that imposed a
penalty.178 The court of appeals did not reach the liquidated damages
question, however, because it rejected the premise that the mortgagor's prepayment, made in accordance with the terms of the loan
contract, was a breach. 179 As there was no breach, there was "no
occasion to consider damages ... much less to alter the contract."180
The Maryland answer to the question of whether a liquidated damages
analysis would be appropriate when prepayment results from the
lender's acceleration of the loan following the mortgagor's default
will "await a case presenting those facts." 181

v.

CONCLUSION

The Promenade Towers decision settled the issue of whether
Maryland follows the rule of perfect tender in time. Although the
process began with Carlyle Apartments, a comprehensive judicial
approach to the enforcement of that rule and to the interpretation
of negotiated prepayment arrangements has yet to develop in Mar176. 333 Md. 265, 635 A.2d 366 (1994). This opinion was issued in response to
questions certified to the court by the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland. [d. at 265 n.l, 635A.2d at 366 n.t.
177. [d. at 267, 635 A.2d at 366-67. For a discussion of yield equivalent prepayment
premium calculations see supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text. This case
illustrates a common criticism of the use of government securities as the index
investment for yield equivalent calculations. See supra note 116. The selection
of Treasury Notes as the yield against which the prepayment fee was to be
calculated apparently was the catalyst to this mortgagor's challenge to the
prepayment premium, as the mortgagor was not attempting to avoid the
prepayment fee altogether. Carlyle Apartments, 333 Md. at 280, 635 A.2d at
373. The note rate on the loan was 10.250/0. At the time the mortgagor
requested payoff figures from the lender the Treasury Note Yield was 4.136%,
while the "FHFB Nat'l Mortgage Contract Rate" was approximately 7.49%.
[d. at 269 n.2, 635 A.2d at 367 n.2. The yield difference was thus over 3%
higher than had a mortgage-related interest rate index been chosen, a significant
difference on a loan exceeding $3 million.
178. Carlyle Apartments, 333 Md. at 280, 635 A.2d at 373; see supra notes 116 &
177.
179. Carlyle Apartments, 333 Md. at 270-74, 635 A.2d at 368-70; see supra note
164.
180. Carlyle Apartments, 330 Md. at 279, 635 A.2d at 373.
181. [d. at 278n.4, 635 A.2d at 372 n.4.
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yland. When faced with these issues, however, Maryland judges will
have the advantage of starting with a clean slate and will, if care is
taken, be able to avoid some of the inconsistencies and contradictions
that have developed in other jurisdictions.
First, the rule of perfect tender in time should mean that a
prepayment not provided for in the loan documents is a breach, not
that it is prohibited absolutely. Maryland courts should be willing to
abrogate or distinguish the limited case law that supports specific
performance of a loan contract,.82 and allow mortgagors, even where
the contract is silent, to breach by prepayment. As in any other
breach of contract action, the mortgagor should then be held liable
for all damages proved by the lender. 183 The modern use of yield
maintenance clauses and other such prepayment options has shown
that the expectation interest of the lender is quantifiable; the lender
should not be able to use silence in order to circumvent the usual
contract remedies. Silence should represent the decision of the lender
to pursue actual damages in the event of a breach by prepayment
instead of establishing a predetermined approximation that may not,
in fact, result in full recompense for the effects of an early repayment.
Second, where the cost of the right to prepay is predetermined
and specified in the loan documents, Maryland judges should be
willing to enforce the clauses as drafted. Drafters of loan documents
and parties involved in loan negotiations have a responsibility to
clearly define the intention of the parties regarding loan prepayment
rights. Once those rights are established, however, the agreement
reached by the parties should be respected, especially in commercial
settings involving sophisticated parties with equivalent bargaining
power. Where the mortgagor has agreed to pay a prepayment premium regardless of the event precipitating the prepayment, that
agreement should be honored.

182. The Carlyle Apartments court quoted Pierson v. Pyles, 234 Md. 119, 124, 197
A.2d 89, 893 (1964), for the following proposition: "We do not think the
situation here calls for a result which would defeat valuable contractual rights
of the [lender]." Carlyle Apartments, 333 Md. at 279, 635 A.2d at 373. There
is a significant difference, however, between the court's upholding of a contractual clause providing for a premium in exchange for the right to prepay in
Carlyle Apartments and the court's de facto grant of specific performance of
the installment land sales contract in Pierson. See supra notes 102-06. Hopefully, the court's use of an appropriate quote from Pierson does not represent
an unwillingness to reexamine the conclusion reached in that case.
183. This is thus not a suggestion that the effect of Promenade Towers be lessened
or that the balance of rights between the lender and borrower established by
that case be changed. Damages should include costs incurred as a result of a
borrower's attempts to frustrate the lender's pursuit of actual damages, and
the lender's security interest in the property should extend to the borrower's
liability for damages.
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Finally, if a liquidated damages analysis is applied to evaluate
a prepayment premium when the prepayment is prompted by the
lender's acceleration of the loan following a mortgagor default, the
courts should take care to consider all relevant factors when determining the effect of the prepayment on the lender. In addition to
the contract-to-market interest rate differential, tax ramifications, the
cost of reinvestment, and the relative risks of the investment options
foreseeably available to the lender in comparison to the loan being
prepaid should be evaluated. Where the calculation specified by the
prepayment clause is reasonable, even though not exact, the negotiated amount should be awarded. Where the amount determined by
the prepayment clause is clearly unreasonable or exorbitant, the courts
should either modify the award to eliminate the unreasonable feature,
or allow the lender to prove actual damages. Striking the prepayment
clause altogether ignores the relative rights of the parties prior to
negotiation and inverts the rule of "perfect tender in time" to give
the borrower the absolute right to prepay without charge.
Rebecca C. Dietz

